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Abstract
Blowfish privacy is a recent generalisation of differential privacy that enables improved utility while maintaining privacy
policies with semantic guarantees, a factor that has driven the popularity of differential privacy in computer science. This paper
relates Blowfish privacy to an important measure of privacy loss of information channels from the communications theory
community: min-entropy leakage. Symmetry in an input data neighbouring relation is central to known connections between
differential privacy and min-entropy leakage. But while differential privacy exhibits strong symmetry, Blowfish neighbouring
relations correspond to arbitrary simple graphs owing to the framework’s flexible privacy policies. To bound the min-entropy
leakage of Blowfish-private mechanisms we organise our analysis over symmetrical partitions corresponding to orbits of graph
automorphism groups. A construction meeting our bound with asymptotic equality demonstrates sharpness.
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1A Graph Symmetrisation Bound on Channel
Information Leakage under Blowfish Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
D IFFERENTIAL privacy [1] has emerged as a leading measure of privacy loss across the machine learning, theoreticalcomputer science, databases and computer security communities. Its success is due in large part to strong guarantees
on the indistinguishability of input datasets based on releases of randomised mechanisms such as learned models [2], [3] and
derived data structures [4] over sensitive data. This indistinguishability takes the form of mechanism response distribution
smoothness over pairs of adjacent datasets—those that differ in one record. By relaxing the differential privacy adjacency
relation, randomised mechanisms may achieve higher utility for the same privacy level on select pairs of datasets. The Blowfish
framework, introduced by He et al. [5], attains this goal while maintaining meaningful privacy policies. As a result, Blowfish
adjacency relations may lack the symmetry of those under differential privacy.
Our goal in this paper is to examine Blowfish privacy and relate it to min-entropy leakage [6]—a leading notion of privacy
in communications theory. Specifically we establish that bounded Blowfish privacy implies bounded min-entropy leakage.
Together with previous work [5], [7]–[9] this completes the following strict hierarchy (with the converse implications not
holding [5], [9]).
Differential privacy⇒ Blowfish privacy⇒ Information leakage
The dataset adjacency relation can be viewed as a simple graph. Previous work bounding information leakage of differentially-
private mechanisms exploit strong symmetry assumptions of this graph. While this corresponds to distance regularity and vertex
transitivity, Blowfish-induced graphs can be arbitrary. As a result the challenge for analysing Blowfish privacy is one of graph
symmetrisation. Our main bounds accomplish this by developing a new proof technique that organises the graph by vertex-
transitive automorphism orbits. Beyond demonstrating a meaningful connection, we discuss implications of our results on
understanding of both Blowfish and information-leakage frameworks.
Before describing our main results, we overview related work and describe necessary background material in differential
privacy (Section II). Our presentation of Blowfish privacy is greatly simplified over the original exposition [5], and thus may
be of independent interest.
A. Related Work
While differential privacy’s success is owed in large part to its worst-case guarantees, researchers have sought natural
relaxations that: improve utility while maintaining semantic privacy guarantees, offering generic mechanisms, and permitting
mechanism composition.
Approximate (, δ)-differential privacy—the most well-known variant—relaxes pure -differential privacy response distribu-
tion smoothness, on low-probability responses [1]. In so doing, it permits guarantees on privacy loss for highly concentrated
mechanisms such as the Gaussian [10]. Citing the ensuing unbounded residual privacy risk on tails, Mironov [11] proposed
Re´nyi differential privacy, based on Re´nyi divergence, to generalise (approximate) differential privacy while bounding tails of
the privacy loss random variable. An alternate approach based on bounding all moments of the privacy loss variable, improving
rates for composition of approximate DP, is concentrated differential privacy (CDP) [12].
Noting that pathological datasets can contribute to high query sensitivity, and so high utility loss, Hall et al. [13] introduced
random differential privacy which requires response distribution smoothness to hold not on all datasets but rather on i.i.d.
datasets with high probability. Their framework permits analysis of mechanisms run on unbounded input data, for example,
and permits private release under estimation of sensitivity of black-box functions [14].
Kifer and Machanavajjhala [15] proposed the Pufferfish privacy framework to provide privacy guarantees in the face of
varying threat models. Notably the framework accounts for prior releases of non-differentially private information. Kifer and
Machanavajjhala [16] demonstrate that without such an extension, large amounts of sensitive information may be leaked.
Inspired by Pufferfish, and a focus of this paper, is the Blowfish framework introduced by He et al. [5]. As detailed in
Section II-A, the approach taken is for the defender to define a subset of data values to keep secret, as well as constraints on
data already known publicly. These secrets and constraints together induce the adjacency relation on which response distribution
smoothness is (relaxed) to hold on. In this way the generalised Blowfish threat model is parametrised by a semantic privacy
policy. While Blowfish privacy adopts the smoothness criterion on response distributions of differential privacy, relaxations
including Re´nyi DP and CDP are built on the same adjacency relationship.
The communications theory community have also developed frameworks for guaranteeing privacy, exemplified by the study
of quantitative information flow [6] which characterises how information channels leak information with change to distributional
entropy (viz., Section II-B). We continue to study the connections between quantitative information flow and differential privacy
as initiated by Alvim et al. [7].
2II. BACKGROUND
We next recall the Blowfish and information flow frameworks.
A. Blowfish Privacy
Adopting the language of differential privacy [1] from statistical databases, we consider a database D as comprising n
records each taking a value in the set of values T . As each record may for example represent a database system record or
a dataset instance or labelled example, we refer to elements of T as tuples. Reflecting constraints on permissible database
members—e.g., representing correlations known publicly and in particular by an adversary—databases are elements of some
chosen I ⊆ T n. Importantly, we do not assume that the data is independent or that it was generated by some stochastic
process.
We define a secret graph G = (T , E) on the database constituent values, to be a simple graph with vertex set the tuple
values T . The edge set E ⊆ T × T reflects which value pairs must be kept indistinguishable to the adversary.
Definition 1 (Blowfish policies). A Blowfish policy P = (G, I) comprises a secret graph G = (T , E) over database tuple
values T and a (possibly constrained) set of permissible databases on n tuples, I ⊆ T n.
We next make four preliminary definitions that lift secret tuple pairs to secret database pairs. For databases D,D′ ∈ I the
total difference is the set of tuples which differ between D and D′, in particular it is the set of triples (i, u, v) which indicate
that the ith tuples in D,D′ are u and v respectively:
∆T(D,D
′) =
{
(i, u, v) ∈ [n]× T 2 | u = Di, v = D′i, u 6= v
}
.
The secret difference between D and D′ is the subset of the total difference for which u and v are kept secret under Blowfish
policy P :
∆S(D,D
′) = {(i, u, v) ∈ ∆T(D,D′) | (u, v) ∈ E} .
Definition 2 (Minimally secretly different). A pair of databases D and D′ are secretly different if they have a non-empty
secret difference, i.e., ∆S(D,D′) 6= ∅. Two databases D,D′ ∈ I are minimally secretly different under Blowfish policy P if
both
(a) (secretly different) ∆S(D,D′) 6= ∅; and
(b) (no closer intermediate database) There exists no D′′ ∈ I such that ∆S(D,D′′) 6= ∅ and
(i) (smaller secret difference) ∆S(D,D′′) ( ∆S(D,D′); or
(ii) (same secret difference, smaller total difference) ∆S(D,D′′) = ∆S(D,D′) and ∆T(D,D′′) ( ∆T(D,D′).
Definition 3 (Database adjacency graph). A Blowfish policy P = (G, I) induces a database adjacency graph with vertex set
I. Two databases D,D′ ∈ I are adjacent in this graph—i.e., D ∼ D′—if and only if they are minimally secretly different.
This definition describes the pairs of databases over which we require a Blowfish private mechanism to have a smooth
response distribution. In the differential privacy setting we are concerned with pairs of databases which differ in a single
tuple. The definition of minimally secretly different generalises this concept for the Blowfish privacy setting where we have a
restricted set of permissible databases I and secret values (u, v) ∈ E.
Example 4. An example introduced by He et al. [5, Section 3.1] is the distance threshold secret. For T with the metric d and
some θ ∈ R the distance threshold secrets graph is Gθ = (T , E), with (u, v) ∈ E if d(u, v) ≤ θ. Figures 1(a) and (b) show
secret and adjacency graphs respectively for a simple example. Applications of distance threshold secrets include data on age
and salary.
Definition 5 (Blowfish privacy). Let  > 0 and P = (G, I) be a policy with induced database adjacency graph (I,∼). A
randomised mechanism K is said to be (, P )-Blowfish private if, for all D,D′ ∈ I, D ∼ D′ and all measurable S ⊆ range(K),
mechanism K satisfies
Pr(K(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp() · Pr(K(D′) ∈ S) .
Note that differential privacy is a special case of Blowfish privacy where: the secret graph G is a complete graph over T
i.e., E = T 2; permissible datasets are unconstrained I = T n; and as a result, ∼ reduces to the usual neighbouring relation
from differential privacy.
31 2 3 4
(a)
1,1 1,2 1,3 1,4
2,1 2,2 2,3 2,4
3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4
4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4
(b)
Fig. 1: Example 4’s (a) distance-threshold secrets graph Gθ on T = [4]. θ = 1 corresponds to only the solid edges, θ = 2 also
includes the dotted edges, and θ = 3 includes all edges; and (b) the corresponding database adjacency graph for the policy
and n = 2.
B. Quantitative Information Flow
Quantitative information flow [6] models an information-theoretic channel as a triple (X ,Z,K). Representing channel input
and output, X and Z are discrete random variables (viz., Remark 7) over the domains X = {x1, . . . , x`} and Z = {z1, . . . , zp}
respectively. K represents the channel matrix conditional probabilities Ki,j = Pr(Z = zj | X = xi). And if the prior
distribution pi over X is such that pii = Pr(X = xi), then the joint probability distribution over X and Z factors as
p(xi, zj) = Pr(X = xi) Pr(Z = zj | X = xi) = piiKi,j .
The vulnerability of random variable X is defined by V (X) = maxi∈[`] Pr(X = xi), representing the worst-case probability
that an adversary can correctly guess the value of X in a single try. Similarly, the conditional vulnerability representing the prob-
ability of an adversary correctly guessing X in a single try after observing Z, is defined by V (X|Z) = ∑j∈[p] maxi∈[`] Pr(X =
xi) Pr(Z = zj | X = xi).
Measured as information, vulnerability is equivalent to the min-entropy H∞(X) = − log V (X) of X , and the conditional
min-entropy H∞(X|Z) = − log V (X|Z) of X given Z.1 Information leakage (or min-entropy leakage) is the difference
between the min-entropy before and after observing the output Z, i.e., I∞(X;Z) = H∞(X)−H∞(X|Z). We will make use
of a simplification of the min-entropy of channel matrices under uniform prior.
Lemma 6. Let (X ,Z,K) be an information-theoretic channel, with X,Z random variables over domains X and Z respectively.
K is the `× p channel matrix. If X has the uniform distribution over X then, H∞(X|Z) = − log 1`
∑p
j=1 maxiKi,j , i.e., the
information leakage of the channel is equal to the sum of the column maxima of K.
Proof: We know that
V (X|Z) =
∑
z∈Z
max
x∈X
Pr(X = x) Pr(X = x | Z = z) =
p∑
j=1
max
i
1
`
Ki,j =
1
`
p∑
j=1
max
i
Ki,j ,
since X is uniformly distributed over X with cardinality `. And since HK∞(X|Z) = − log V (X|Z), we have that HK∞(X|Z) =
− log 1`
∑p
j=1 maxiKi,j .
C. Differential Privacy Implies Bounded Information Leakage
Alvim et al. [9] consider a differentially-private mechanism K as an information-theoretic channel (X ,Z,K) with X = I
the set of permissible databases, Z = range(K) the mechanism’s response space, and K the ` × p channel matrix with
Ki,j = Pr(K(xi) = zj). They established that the differential privacy of K implies an upper bound on the information leakage
for the corresponding channel. They also demonstrate that this implication does not go the other way: a channel with known
information leakage does not necessarily satisfy -differential privacy for any .
1 We use the notation HK∞(X|Z) to refer to the min-entropy H∞(X|Z) for the channel matrix K when the channel matrix in question is not clear from
the context.
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Fig. 2: Upper bound on Example 4’s information
leakage for T = [4] as n is varied,  held constant.
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Fig. 3: The database adjacency graph used for the construction in
Proposition 13 demonstrating sharpness of our main bound on information
leakage.
A release mechanism K with corresponding channel matrix K being (, P )-Blowfish private is equivalent to the statement
that, for all i, h ∈ [`] and all j ∈ [p] such that2 i ∼ h,
exp(−) ≤ Ki,j
Kh,j
≤ exp() . (1)
Remark 7. Like Alvim et al. [9], we assume channels with discrete input and output spaces which correspond to discrete
data and responses. Rounding due to finite precision in floating-point implementations of private mechanisms can cause low-
probability responses to become zero-probability [17], violating differential/Blowfish privacy. It is therefore regarded best
practice that privacy analysis of mechanisms require discrete response distributions [18, Remark 2.1]. We assume suitably
discretised distributions.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Maximum information leakage is attained for a uniform prior over input X [19]. As a result, we can assume a uniform prior
in order to derive a general upper bound on information leakage for K, holding when the random variables X and Z have any
distribution over X and Z .
Theorem 8 (Min-entropy of Blowfish-private mechanisms). Let  > 0 and P be a Blowfish policy. Let (X ,Z,K) be the
channel which corresponds to a mechanism K satisfying (, P )-Blowfish privacy. If X has the uniform distribution then,
H∞(X|Z) ≥ − log
(
1
`
q∑
t=1
exp (dt)
)
,
where ` = |X |, q is the number of connected components of database adjacency graph (X ,∼) and, for t ∈ [q], dt is the tth
connected component’s diameter, i.e., the maximal shortest-path distance between any pair of vertices in the component.
Motivated examples of Blowfish adjacency graphs from the literature [5], [20] are frequently connected or have q  `.
Example 9. Revisiting the Gθ secret graph of Example 4, the induced adjacency graph (X ,∼) is connected unless T contains
consecutive values u, v such that d(u, v) > θ.
Main Theorem 10 (Information leakage of Blowfish-private mechanisms). Let  > 0 and P be a Blowfish policy. Let (X ,Z,K)
be the channel which corresponds to a (, P )-Blowfish-private mechanism K. Then there is an upper bound on the information
leakage of K,
I∞(X;Z) ≤ log
(
q∑
t=1
exp (dt)
)
, (2)
where q is the number of connected components of (X ,∼) and dt is the diameter of the tth connected component for t ∈ [q].
Note that this result holds for all prior distributions on X .
In the case that (X ,∼) is connected, (2) simplifies to I∞(X;Z) ≤ d, where d = Diam(X ,∼). As expected, increasing
Blowfish privacy (small ) pushes down the bound on information leakage.
2When discussing channel matrices we will often refer to elements of the input and output sets by their indices, e.g., writing xi ∼ xh as i ∼ h.
5Theorem 10 can best be understood by observing the effects of removing secrets. This corresponds to removing edges
from the secrets graph which will induce (X ,∼) with monotonically increasing diameter; the bound on information leakage
increases. On the other hand, a policy with fewer secrets requires less noise to attain the same Blowfish privacy level .
Decreasing noise also explains increasing information leakage.
Growing information leakage is consistent with a constant Blowfish privacy level precisely because min-entropy and related
privacy loss measures do not encapsulate fine-grained policies on secrets.
Example 11. Again revisiting Example 4’s Gθ secret graph, Figure 2 plots the relationship between n and our bound on
information leakage for θ ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Increasing θ corresponds to holding more pairs of values secret, so the slower growth
under larger θ is as expected.
Under differential privacy (a special case of Blowfish), the adjacency graph exhibits distance regularity and vertex transitivity.
Previous work focusing only on differential privacy therefore made strong assumptions in the form of this graph symmetry [9].
The challenge in proving our main results is that we may make no symmetry assumptions (viz., Proposition 12). We therefore
symmetrise by organising the graph into vertex-transitive automorphism orbits.
Proposition 12. Let A = (VA, EA) be an arbitrary undirected graph. Then there exists a Blowfish policy P = (G, I) such
that the induced database adjacency graph (I,∼) = (VA, EA).
Proof: Let the secret graph G = (T , E) where T = VA and E = EA, i.e., the set of tuples coincides with the vertices
in A and the secret pairs of values correspond to adjacent vertices in A. Let the set of permissible databases be all databases
with one tuple, so I = T 1.
Now we must show that two databases D = (u), D′ = (v) ∈ I are adjacent in the database adjacency graph (i.e., D ∼ D′)
if and only if u and v are adjacent in A (i.e., (u, v) ∈ EA). That is, we must show that D and D′ are minimally secretly
different (Definition 2) iff (u, v) ∈ EA.
We have three cases: (a) u = v, (b) u 6= v and (u, v) 6∈ EA, or (c) u 6= v and (u, v) ∈ EA. In case (a) we have
∆S(D,D
′) ⊆ ∆T(D,D′) = ∅ and thus Definition 2.a does not hold, so D and D′ are not neighbouring databases. Also
since u = v, (u, v) 6∈ EA. In case (b) we have ∆T(D,D′) = {(1, u, v)}, but since (u, v) 6∈ EA we have (u, v) 6∈ E and so
∆S(D,D
′) = ∅. Again, Definition 2.a does not hold and so D and D′ are not neighbouring databases.
In case (c) we have ∆T(D,D′) = {(1, u, v)}. Since (u, v) ∈ EA we have (u, v) ∈ E and so ∆S(D,D′) = {(1, u, v)} as well.
Now Definition 2.a is satisfied. To show D ∼ D′ we need to demonstrate that there does not exist D′′ with ∆S(D,D′′) 6= ∅
satisfying Definition 2.a.i or Definition 2.a.ii. Suppose there exists D′′ ∈ I with ∆S(D,D′′) 6= ∅. The maximum size of
∆T(D,D
′′) is 1 since I is the set of databases with 1 tuple, so |∆T(D,D′′)| ≤ 1. Also since ∆S(D,D′′) 6= ∅, 1 ≤
|∆S(D,D′′)|. Combining these properties, along with the fact that ∆S(D,D′′) ⊆ ∆T(D,D′′) we have 1 ≤ |∆S(D,D′′)| ≤
|∆T(D,D′′)| ≤ 1. So ∆S(D,D′′) must not be a proper subset of ∆S(D,D′) and ∆T(D,D′′) must not be a proper subset of
∆T(D,D
′); thus neither Definition 2.a.i not Definition 2.a.ii are satisfied. So D and D′ are not adjacent in (I,∼).
So, in all possible cases D,D′ ∈ I are minimally secretly different—and hence D ∼ D′ in (I,∼)—if and only if
(u, v) ∈ EA. So the policy P induces a database adjacency graph (I,∼) which coincides with the arbitrary graph A = (VA, EA).
To demonstrate sharpness of our bound, we next construct a family of channel matrices and an adjacency graph that
asymptotically meet our bound with equality, and for which previous bounds [7]–[9] do not hold.
Proposition 13. There exist a family of mechanisms K(δ), for δ > 0, and a Blowfish policy P , such that the Main Theorem 10
upper bound on information leakage is equal to the information leakage, asymptotically. Namely,
lim
δ↓0
log (
∑q
t=1 exp((δ) · dt))
I∞
(
X;K(δ)(X)
) = 1 ,
where K(δ) denotes the channel matrix for mechanism K(δ) and K(δ)(X) denotes its output random variable Z, (δ) represents
the Blowfish privacy level of K(δ) with respect to policy P , q and d1, . . . , dq are the number of connected components of (I,∼P )
and the corresponding component diameters. In particular, the policy P ’s induced adjacency graph (I,∼P ) is neither vertex
transitive nor distance regular.
Proof: Consider a fixed integer n > 1, and define the undirected graph (X , EX) with nodes x1, . . . , x2n+2 as shown in Fig-
ure 3: one complete connected component {x1, . . . , x4}, and n−1 complete connected components {x5, x6}, . . . , {x2n+1, x2n+2},
for a total of q = n connected components. Note that: component t ∈ [n] has diameter dt = 1; the graph is not regular and
so cannot be vertex transitive; and because there are 2 nodes at distance one from connected nodes x1, x2 but no nodes at
distance one from connected nodes x5, x6, that the graph is not distance regular. By Proposition 12, there exists a Blowfish
policy P = (G, I) such that the database adjacency graph (I,∼) = (X , EX), where the permissible databases I coincide
with the elements of X . As it is the database adjacency graph that directly impacts our bound on information leakage, we will
not make further reference to details of P .
6For real δ > 0, consider the block diagonal channel matrix K(δ), with input variable X uniformly distributed on the vertex
set of our constructed graph X = {x1, . . . , x2n+2}, and output variable Z(δ) on finite space Z of cardinality 2n+ 2.
K(δ) =
1
4 + 2δ

1 + δ 1 + δ 1 1
1 1 + δ 1 + δ 1
1 1 1 + δ 1 + δ
1 + δ 1 1 1 + δ
· · · 0
...
2 + 2δ 2
2 2 + 2δ
...
. . .
0 · · · 2 + 2δ 2
2 2 + 2δ

.
Each row of K(δ) is normalised by dividing by constant 4 + 2δ. By construction of the block structure and common
normalising constants, the maximum ratio of any two elements within a column, between rows xi ∼ xj is simply 1 + δ and
therefore the corresponding mechanism K(δ) preserves ((δ), P )-Blowfish privacy for (δ):= log(1 + δ), independent of free
parameter n.
Since X is uniformly distributed over X the information leakage of K(δ) is given by the log of the sum of column maxima,
I∞(X;K(δ)(X)) = H∞(X)−H∞(X|Z(δ)) = log
(
V (X|Z(δ))
V (X)
)
= log
(∑2n+2
j=1 maxi∈[2n+2] Pr(X = xi) Pr(Z
(δ) = zj |X = xi)
maxi∈[2n+2] Pr(X = xi)
)
= log
(
1
2n+2
∑2n+2
j=1 maxi∈[2n+2]K
(δ)
ij
1
2n+2
)
= log
(
4(1 + δ) + (2n− 2)(2 + 2δ)
4 + 2δ
)
.
Putting these calculations together, noting that the limit of the ratio of logs is the ratio of logs of the limits since log is a
continuous function and the denominator is a positive constant in the limit,
lim
δ↓0
log (
∑q
t=1 exp((δ) · dt))
I∞
(
X;K(δ)(X)
) = lim
δ↓0
log(n(1 + δ))
log
(
4n(1+δ)
4+2δ
) = log(n)
log(n)
= 1 .
As such we have constructed a family of mechanisms K(δ) which are ((δ), P )-Blowfish private for (δ) := 1 + δ and
Blowfish policy P such that the upper bound from Main Theorem 10 is attained in the limit, as δ ↓ 0.
IV. GRAPH SYMMETRISATION
To prove Theorems 8 and 10 we perform matrix operations which maintain the (, P )-Blowfish privacy and information
leakage of the channel K.
The first of these transformations (Lemma 18) takes the ` × p channel matrix K to an ` × ` channel matrix K ′ such that
each column attains its maximum value in the diagonal. This matrix K ′ satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy and attains the same
information leakage as K.
Second (viz., Lemma 19), this K ′ is transformed into an `× ` channel matrix K ′′, also satisfying (, P )-Blowfish privacy
and maintaining the same information leakage. Additionally all diagonal elements of K ′′ which are in the same orbit of some
automorphism group Γ over the adjacency graph are equal: for all if i, h ∈ [`] members of the same Γ-orbit, K ′′i,i = K ′′h,h. A
key property of these orbits is that they are vertex transitive.
In the specific case where X has the uniform distribution over X , the properties of the partitions of K ′′ allow us to find a
lower bound for min-entropy. Since information leakage achieves its maximum over the uniform distribution this allows us to
bound information leakage for arbitrary priors over X .
a) Abstract algebra basics.: Before detailing our results, we list group-theoretic notation required for our proofs. We focus
on the database adjacency graph (X ,∼) induced by chosen Blowfish policy P . Note that the neighbouring relation ∼ imposes
no restrictions on the graph: Proposition 12 demonstrates that any simple graph can be induced by P . In particular, (X ,∼)
need not be vertex transitive nor distance regular unlike adjacency graphs under differential privacy [9]. We use d(xi, xj) to
denote the geodesic distance between xi and xj in (X ,∼), i.e., the number of edges in a shortest path connecting xi and xj .
We refer to the (full) automorphism group of (X ,∼) by Aut(X ,∼), and consider Γ ⊆ Aut(X ,∼) to be an automorphism
(sub)group of (X ,∼). For u ∈ X , denote the stabiliser of u in Γ by Γu = {σ ∈ Γ | σ(u) = u}. Additionally, denote the
Γ-orbit of u in X by Γ(u) = {γ(u) | γ ∈ Γ} ⊆ X .
7If Γ(u) = X for some (and hence all) u ∈ X then Γ is said to be transitive on X and X is said to be Γ-vertex transitive.
We say that (X ,∼) is vertex transitive if it is Aut(X ,∼)-vertex transitive.
For u, v ∈ X the following notation is introduced in [9, p.28] to indicate the set of automorphisms in Γ taking u to v, i.e.,
Γu→v = {σ ∈ Γ | σ(u) = v}. Note that Γu→v is not a group unless u = v, in which case Γu→v = Γu→u = Γu.
Additional graph-theoretic results used in the proof of Lemma 19 are introduced next.
A. Technical Symmetrisation Lemmata
Lemma 14. Let (X ,∼) be an undirected graph. Let u, v ∈ X . Let Γ ∈ Aut(X ,∼). Let σ ∈ Γu→v . Let σΓu denote the left
coset {σ ◦ γ | γ ∈ Γu}. Then,
Γu→v = σΓu .
Proof: For γ ∈ Γu we have σ ◦ γ(u) = σ(γ(u)) = σ(u) = v, so σ ◦ γ ∈ Γu→v , so σΓu ⊆ Γu→v .
Conversely, for γ ∈ Γu→v we have γ(u) = v = σ(u) and u = σ−1(v). So σ−1 ◦ γ(u) = σ−1(γ(u)) = σ−1(v) = u, and as
such σ−1 ◦ γ ∈ Γu. Hence σ ◦ σ−1 ◦ γ = γ ∈ σΓu. So Γu→v ⊆ σΓu.
Since σΓu ⊆ Γu→v and Γu→v ⊆ σΓu, we have shown that Γu→v = σΓu.
Lemma 15. Let (X ,∼) be an undirected graph. Let u, v ∈ X . Let Γ ∈ Aut(X ,∼). Let σ ∈ Γu→v . Let Γvσ denote the right
coset {γ ◦ σ | γ ∈ Γv}. Then,
Γu→v = Γvσ .
Proof: For γ ∈ Γv we have γ(σ(u)) = γ(v) = v, so γ ◦ σ ∈ Γv , so Γvσ ⊆ Γu→v .
Consider γ ∈ Γu→v . We have γ(u) = v = σ(u), and as such γ ◦ σ−1(v) = γ(u) = v, so γ ◦ σ−1 ∈ Γv and γ ◦ σ−1σ = γ ∈
Γvσ. So Γu→v ⊆ Γvσ.
Since Γvσ ⊆ Γu→v and Γu→v ⊆ Γvσ, we have shown that Γu→v = Γvσ.
Lemma 16. Let (X ,∼) be an undirected graph. Let u, v ∈ X . Let Γ ∈ Aut(X ,∼). Then,
|Γu→v| = |Γu| = |Γ||Γ(u)| =
|Γ|
|Γ(v)| = |Γv| .
Proof: We start by citing the orbit-stabiliser theorem (e.g., see Dixon and Mortimer [21, Theorem 1.4A]). For any u ∈ X
we have
|Γu| = |Γ||Γ(u)| .
From Lemma 14 we have, |Γu→v| = |σΓu| = |Γu|. Similarly, from Lemma 15 we have |Γu→v| = |Γvσ| = |Γv|. So applying
the orbit-stabiliser theorem, we have
|Γu→v| = |Γu| = |Γ||Γ(u)| and |Γu→v| = |Γv| =
|Γ|
|Γ(v)| ,
establishing the result.
Lemma 17. Let (X ,∼) be an undirected graph. Let u, v ∈ X . Let Γ ∈ Aut(X ,∼). If Γu→v 6= ∅ then,
|Γu| = |Γv| .
Proof: Let σ ∈ Γu→v . Let γ ∈ Γu. So γ(u) = u, and σ(γ(u)) = σ(u) = v. Also σ−1(v) = u, so σ ◦ γ ◦ σ−1(v) =
σ(γ(σ−1(v))) = σ(γ(u)) = v. So for any σ ∈ Γu→v and γ ∈ Γu we have σ ◦ γ ◦ σ−1 ∈ Γv . So σΓuσ−1 ⊆ Γv .
Thus we have |σΓuσ−1| = |Γu| ≤ |Γv|. Similarly, by exchanging the roles of u and v above, we get that |Γv| ≤ |Γu|. Since
|Γu| ≤ |Γv| and |Γv| ≤ |Γu| then |Γu| = |Γv|.
B. Channel Matrix Transformations
We now develop the matrix transformations discussed in the sketch above. First we transform channel matrix K to attain
column maxima along the diagonal.
Lemma 18. Let K be an `× p channel matrix such that K satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy. Then there exists an `× ` matrix
K ′ such that:
(a) K ′ is a channel matrix, i.e., K ′i,j ∈ [0, 1] and
∑`
h=1K
′
i,h = 1 for all i, j ∈ [`];
(b) Each column j ∈ [`] has a maximum in the diagonal, K ′j,j = maxi∈[`]K ′i,j;
(c) K ′ satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy, K ′i,j ≤ eK ′h,j for all i, j, h ∈ [`] such that i ∼ h; and
(d) If X has the uniform distribution over X then the conditional min-entropies for channel matrices K,K ′ are equal, i.e.,
HK
′
∞ (X|Z) = HK∞(X|Z).
8Proof: First we assume that K is an ` × p matrix, with ` ≤ p. This assumption is without loss of generality as we
can append all-zero columns until this condition is satisfied, corresponding to augmenting the output set Z with elements of
probability 0. That is, Z ′ = Z ∪ {zp+1, zp+2, . . . , z`} holds with Pr(Z = zi) = 0 for all i ∈ {p+ 1, . . . , `}.
From here the proof of [9, Lemma 7] is sufficient. The definition of -differential privacy in this proof is identical to
the definition of (, P )-Blowfish privacy, except for the structure of the adjacency relation ∼. As [9, Lemma 7] makes no
assumptions about this relation the same arguments go through for (, P )-Blowfish private channel K.
We next transform the channel matrix such that the diagonal corresponds to the matrix maximum within column orbits.
Lemma 19. Let K ′ be an `× ` channel matrix satisfying the conditions in Lemma 18, and (X ,∼) be the adjacency graph.
Let Γ be a subgroup of Aut(X ,∼) and K ′′ the matrix defined by:
K ′′i,j =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(i),σ(j), i, j ∈ [`] .
Then K ′′ has the following properties:
(a) K ′′ is a channel matrix, i.e., K ′′i,j ∈ [0, 1] and
∑`
h=1K
′′
i,h = 1 for all i, j ∈ [`];
(b) Each diagonal entry of K ′′ is the maximum in its column j ∈ [`]: K ′′j,j = maxi∈[`]K ′′i,j; moreover K ′′i,i = K ′′h,h whenever
i, h are in the same Γ-orbit on X ; if in addition all diagonal entries of K ′ are equal (and hence are maximum entries
of K), then so too are all diagonal entries of K ′′;
(c) K ′′ satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy, K ′′i,j ≤ eK ′′h,j for all i, j, h ∈ [`] such that i ∼ h; and
(d) HK
′′
∞ (X|Z) = HK
′
∞ (X|Z) if X has the uniform distribution over X .
Proof: For i ∈ [`] we have,∑`
j=1
K ′′i,j =
∑`
j=1
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(i),σ(j) =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
∑`
k=1
K ′σ(i),k =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
1 = 1 .
The second equality holds since for σ ∈ Γ, we have {σ(1), . . . , σ(`)} = [`] and the second last equality holds because K ′ is
a channel matrix by Lemma 18(a). This proves property (a).
Let j, h ∈ [`] and σ ∈ Γ. Since K ′ satisfies the conditions of Lemma 18, the maximum entry in its σ(j)th column must be
K ′σ(j),σ(j). So,
K ′′j,j =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(j),σ(j) ≥
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(h),σ(j) = K
′′
h,j .
Hence each diagonal entry of K ′′ is the maximum in its column. For i ∈ [`] we have,
K ′′i,i =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(i),σ(i) =
1
|Γ|
∑
k∈Γ(i)
∑
σ∈Γi→k
K ′k,k =
1
|Γ|
∑
k∈Γ(i)
|Γi→k|K ′k,k .
From Lemma 16 we have |Γi→k|/|Γ| = 1/|Γ(i)|, hence
1
|Γ|
∑
k∈Γ(i)
|Γi→k|K ′k,k =
∑
k∈Γ(i)
1
|Γ(i)|K
′
k,k .
Therefore K ′′i,i =
∑
k∈Γ(i)K
′
k,k/|Γ(i)|. Hence if i, h ∈ [`] such that Γ(i) = Γ(h), i.e., i and h are in the same orbit, then
K ′′i,i = K
′′
h,h. Furthermore, if all diagonal entries of K
′ are equal (and thus equal to the maximum element of K ′), then so
too are all diagonal entries of K ′′, for all i ∈ [`]:
K ′′i,i =
∑
k∈Γ(i)
1
|Γ(i)|K
′
k,k =
∑
k∈Γ(i)
1
|Γ(i)| maxh,j∈[`]K
′
h,j = max
h,j∈[`]
K ′h,j .
This establishes the last part of property (b).
Let i, h ∈ [`] be such that i ∼ h. First note that for all σ ∈ Γ, σ(i) ∼ σ(h) from the definition of an automorphism. Also
note that K ′ satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy, so for all j ∈ [`] we have K ′σ(i),σ(j) ≤ eK ′σ(h),σ(j). So,
K ′′i,j =
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(i),σ(j) ≤
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
eK ′σ(h),σ(j) = e
K ′′h,j .
Therefore K ′′ satisfies (, P )-Blowfish privacy and property (c).
We now prove the final property (d), which is rather more involved than the previous three properties of K ′′. Denote r
the number of Γ-orbits on X . Let X1, . . . ,Xr be these orbits, with cardinalities c1, . . . , cr. Note that {X1, . . . ,Xr} is then
9a partition of X , and that for each s ∈ [r] we have that Xs is Γ-vertex transitive. Fix is ∈ Xs, the generator of Xs so that
Γ(is) = Xs. Then cs = |Xs| = |Γ||Γis | by the orbit-stabiliser theorem.
Denote by [Γ : Γis ] the set of left cosets of Γis in Γ. Choose {σs1, . . . , σscs} to be a set of representatives of [Γ : Γis ], so
that Γ = ∪cst=1σstΓis . For all t ∈ [cs] denote i∗st = σst(is). For all γ ∈ Γis and t ∈ [cs] we have (σst ◦ γ)(is) = σst(is), so
Xs = Γ(is)
=
cs⋃
t=1
{(σst ◦ γ)(is) | γ ∈ Γis}
=
cs⋃
t=1
{σst(is)}
=
cs⋃
t=1
{i∗st}
= {i∗s1, . . . , i∗scs} .
Since Xs is Γ-vertex transitive,
∑
σ∈ΓKσ(j),σ(j) is independent of the choice of j ∈ Xs. Fixing k ∈ Xs, for all j ∈ Xs we
have, ∑
j∈Xs
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(j),σ(j) = cs
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(k),σ(k) = cs
cs∑
t=1
∑
σ∈Γk→i∗st
K ′i∗st,i∗st .
From Lemma 16 we know that |Γk→i∗st | = |Γi∗st |, and so,
cs
cs∑
t=1
∑
σ∈Γk→i∗st
K ′i∗st,i∗st = cs|Γk→i∗st |
cs∑
t=1
K ′i∗st,i∗st = cs|Γi∗st |
cs∑
t=1
K ′i∗st,i∗st .
Since i∗st = σst(is), we know that Γi∗st→is 6= ∅. Thus Lemma 17 yields |Γi∗st | = |Γis |. Also recall that cs = |Γ|/|Γis | andXs = {i∗s1, . . . , i∗scs}. Therefore,
cs|Γi∗st |
cs∑
t=1
K ′i∗st,i∗st = cs|Γis |
cs∑
t=1
K ′i∗st,i∗st = |Γ|
cs∑
t=1
K ′i∗st,i∗st = |Γ|
∑
j∈Xs
K ′j,j .
So
∑
j∈Xs
∑
σ∈ΓK
′
σ(j),σ(j) = |Γ|
∑
j∈Xs K
′
j,j . Now consider,∑`
j=1
K ′′j,j =
r∑
s=1
∑
j∈Xs
K ′′j,j
=
r∑
s=1
∑
j∈Xs
(
1
|Γ|
∑
σ∈Γ
K ′σ(j),σ(j)
)
=
r∑
s=1
∑
j∈Xs
K ′j,j
=
∑`
j=1
K ′j,j .
So the sum of the diagonals of K ′′ is equal to the sum of diagonals of K ′. We know from Lemma 6 that HK∞(X|Z) is
a function of the sum of the maximum entries in each column of K. In addition, we know that both K ′ and K ′′ attain a
maximum for each column in the diagonal from Lemmas 18(b) and 19(b). Therefore we have both
HK
′′
∞ (X|Z) = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
max
i
K ′′i,j = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
K ′′j,j
HK
′
∞ (X|Z) = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
max
i
K ′i,j = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
K ′j,j .
We have shown that
∑`
j=1K
′′
j,j =
∑`
j=1K
′
j,j , and as such H
K′′
∞ (X|Z) = HK
′
∞ (X|Z). So property (d) is satisfied by K ′′.
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C. Proof of Theorem 8
Let , P satisfy the theorem’s conditions, (X ,Z,K) be an (, P )-Blowfish-private channel. Assume X is uniformly distributed
over X . From Lemmas 18 and 19 we know that we can transform the ` × p channel matrix K into an ` × ` channel matrix
K ′′ satisfying Lemma 19’s conditions.
Let q be the number of connected components of (X ,∼). These components, {X (1), . . . ,X (q)}, partition X . From Lemmas 6
and 19(b,d) we know that,
HK∞(X|Z) = HK
′′
∞ (X|Z) = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
max
i
K ′′i,j = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
K ′′j,j .
Let t ∈ [q], and let i, j, k ∈ X (t). For elements i and h in a connected component, the Blowfish privacy definition for a channel
matrix (1) can be extended to K ′′h,j ≤ ed(i,h)K ′′i,j . In particular, letting h = j, this yields K ′′j,j ≤ ed(i,j)K ′′i,j . For each t ∈ [q]
select it ∈ X (t). Also denote the diameter of the connected component X (t) by dt = Diam(X (t)) := maxi,j∈X (t) d(i, j). Now,∑`
j=1
K ′′j,j =
q∑
t=1
∑
j∈X (t)
K ′′j,j
≤
q∑
t=1
∑
j∈X (t)
ed(it,j)K ′′it,j
≤
q∑
t=1
edt
∑
j∈X (t)
K ′′it,j .
Since K ′′ is a channel matrix K ′′i,j ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ [`], so
∑
j∈X (t) K
′′
it,j
≤∑`j=1K ′′it,j . Also since K ′′ is a channel matrix,∑`
j=1K
′′
it,j
= 1. So,
q∑
t=1
edt
∑
j∈X (t)
K ′′it,j ≤
q∑
t=1
edt
∑`
j=1
K ′′it,j =
q∑
t=1
edt .
Then we have
∑`
j=1K
′′
j,j ≤
∑q
t=1 e
dt , hence
HK∞(X|Z) = − log
1
`
∑`
j=1
K ′′j,j ≥ − log
1
`
q∑
t=1
edt .
D. Proof of Main Theorem 10
Assume  and P satisfy the conditions in the theorem statement. Let (X ,Z,K) be an (, P )-Blowfish-private channel. Note
that X can have any prior over X and is not required to be uniformly distributed. Assume Xuniform has the uniform distribution
over X . From Theorem 8 we know that HK∞(Xuniform|Z) ≥ − log 1`
∑q
t=1 e
dt , with q the number of connected components
of X , dt the diameter of component X (t). Observe that min-entropy of Xuniform is HK∞(Xuniform) = − log maxx∈X p(x) =
− log 1/` = log `. So,
IK∞(X
uniform;Z) = HK∞(X
uniform)−HK∞(Xuniform|Z) ≤ log `+ log
1
`
q∑
t=1
edt = log
q∑
t=1
edt .
Braun et al. [19, Proposition 5.1] demonstrate that maximum leakage is attained over the uniform distribution, i.e., IK∞(X;Z) ≤
IK∞(X
uniform;Z). Therefore
IK∞(X;Z) ≤ IK∞(Xuniform;Z) ≤ log
q∑
t=1
edt .
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper considers leading frameworks within two parallel threads of research on privacy-preserving aggregate or model
release: min-entropy leakage within quantitative information flow and Blowfish privacy within differential privacy. The only
known link between threads is a bound of Alvim et al. [9] on min-entropy leakage by differential privacy which requires
strong symmetry assumptions of the database adjacency graph, of distance regularity and vertex transitivity. Adjacency graphs
under Blowfish privacy are arbitrary by design: the appealing property of Blowfish is its relaxation of adjacency for capturing
public knowledge of underlying data. It is therefore interesting to understand how the graph structure of Blowfish semantic
privacy policies—represented by adjacency graphs—bounds min-entropy leakage. We overcome this challenge by organising
analysis around vertex-transitive automorphism orbits. Our results relate these two important frameworks, and shed light on
the structure of Blowfish privacy policies and their implications.
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